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NOTES
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS: A PROPOSED BALANCING TEST
I. INTRODUCTION
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS HAVE NOT ENJOYED FREEDOM OF SPEECH to
the same extent as have their university counterparts.' Public school
teachers, as well as university professors, should be given the benefit of
a broad interpretation of first amendment rights. The importance of
such implimentation of rights is perhaps even more urgent for public
school teachers because of the danger of authoritarian indoctrination
which exists at the secondary public education level.'
Public school teachers must maintain the same status as any other
citizen with regard to the Bill of Rights.' Moreover, it is conceded by
most courts that a teacher has the same rights as any other citizen
when he is not within the classroom.4 However, exceptions have arisen
to this general rule. Teachers were scrutinized closely during the
Communist-hunting era of the 1950's, and in that time period the courts
established a corollary between loyalty to the school district and possible
subversive activities or contacts.5 Loyalty oaths are upheld on certain
occasions, including when a teacher will not pledge support to the Con-
stitution of the United States.' Furthermore, the classification of a resi-
dent alien who has no intention of becoming a citizen of the United
' E. BOLMEIER, TEACHERS' LEGAL RIGHTS, RESTRAINTS AND LIABILITIES 55
(1971) [hereinafter cited as E. BOLMEIER].
2 Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565, 647-55 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Shiffrin]. Professor Shiffrin states in his article that our cur-
rent public educational system is fraught with dangers of indoctrinating students
to the authoritarian viewpoints of centralization elements within the system. He
maintains that one inhibiting factor toward such authoritarian indoctrination is
the alternative route of private education. An added method of curtailing such in-
doctrination would be the fragmentizing of decisionmaking so that children will
be exposed to more than one viewpoint on controversial matters. Such fragmen-
tizing might occur when a teacher instructs his children on the generally ac-
cepted viewpoints regarding the subject; however, he also adds his own view-
point to expand the area. The teacher would be obligated to explain that it is his
opinion and the reasons for his beliefs. Id.
Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, 52 A.R. 626 (1884).
Adams v. State, 69 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1954).
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Frankfurter and Harlan, JJ., dissen-
ting); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
6 See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1981
CLEVELAND STATE LA W REVIEW
States creates an irrebuttable presumption to the Supreme Court of the
inability of said alien to teach American students the value of their
society and government.7 Thus, the courts unfortunately hold at times
that teachers, merely because they are teachers, are subject to curtail-
ment of their the first amendment rights.
The following will be an examination of the permitted limitations of
teachers in regard to their outside-the-classroom activities and speech.
The current state of the law will be reviewed in regard to public school
teachers' participation in political activities, public criticism of ad-
ministrative personnel, personal activities unrelated to vocation, status
with regard to loyalty oaths and the expansion of rights in the area of
union activities.
The question of freedom of speech within the classroom is subject to
more scrutiny by the courts than speech activities outside of the
classroom.8 Within the classroom the test comprises a balancing of state
interests against the teacher's right of free speech. Certain pedagogical
methods are not protected by the first amendment.' The question then
is whether a restraint on teaching methods brings to the classroom an
inhibition to a teacher's creativity and personal viewpoints which
thereby suppresses his ability to be a source of knowledge for his
students. State and local authorities generally assure that community
perspectives only reach the student vis-a-vis dictation of the permitted
courses and the "acceptable" textbooks." Classroom academic freedom
does not extend to teaching material unrelated to the subject matter"
nor to language which is patently offensive by community standards, 2
such as obscenity. 3 Tenure may or may not be a factor when a teacher is
dismissed for advocating unpopular positions within the classroom."
Needless to say, there are a variety of factors utilized by the courts to
determine when the speech of a public school teacher is protected. The
balancing of the relevant factors results in a delicate situation for the
' Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
' Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).
9 Id.
'o Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 652.
" Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 399
(8th Cir. 1972).
" Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974). The court held that
there was a governmental interest in protecting children from exposure to inde-
cent material. Id.
" Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968). The government's in-
terest in the "well-being of its youth" and in supporting "parents' claim to
authority in their own household" justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression. Id.
" See generally Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).
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courts.'5 One eminent scholar has questioned the limitations on constitu-
tional free speech of public school teachers by asking "whether or not
chemistry professors ought to have greater rights of political expres-
sion than those enjoyed by other employees and citizens."'" Such a ques-
tion presupposes that such a professor does have this inherent
privilege. At the present time, there is only dicta by the Supreme Court
which discusses the validity of a free speech doctrine within the
classroom. That dicta encourages diversity of viewpoints within the
ranks of teachers so that wide exposure to ideas is presented to
American youth."
This Note will advocate that freedom of speech should be extended to
public school teachers, in the sense of curricular and extracurricular ac-
tivities.'8 As recent federal cases have held, the teacher is to be treated
no differently from other citizens regarding free speech matters.
II. BALANCING THE TESTS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED
Many of the problems which have occurred with regard to protected
speech of public school teachers have arisen due to the vagueness in-
herent in the tests previously applied by the courts. The lack of a
specific test has allowed the courts wide latitude in arriving at their
conclusions, and school teachers along with school boards and admin-
istrators have few definite guidelines respecting permissible behavior.'9
There is a need for a test which can be applied to all areas of teacher
free speech in order to eliminate much of the confusion regarding what
1" It seems clear that a teacher has the same right to freedom of speech
as does any citizen, and he loses no individual rights by becoming a
teacher. In this connection it should be remembered that one's right to
freedom of speech is not absolute ... [T]he limit of the right is reached
where public injury begins. So long as a teacher does not exercise his
right to freedom of speech in such a manner as to injure the school that
employs him, the board may not curtail it. Needless to say, this balance
between rights of the individual and rights of the public is delicate at
best. Each case, therefore, must be considered separately in light of the
facts that surround it. Consequently, generalization is difficult.
N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LEGAL BASIS OF SCHOOL
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 675 (3d ed. 1971).
1" Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers to
Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PENN. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Goldstein].
" See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (Frankfurter and Harlan, JJ., dissenting); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1" See, e.g., Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
19 A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 528-29 (1974).
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is constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, such a test must apply
to free speech situations in and out of the classroom.
Numerous tests applied over the years seem insufficient to deal with
all situations. Probably the most prominent case which deals with this
problem is Board of Education v. Barnette." The case resulted from a
West Virginia statute which made it compulsory for children in the
public schools to salute the American flag and pledge allegiance.
Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses objected to the statute because it
called for sanctions against children not complying with its provisions.
The sanctions included expulsion of the children from school and fines
and/or jail terms for the parents. Barnette held that the statute was an
infringement of first amendment rights; the Court reasoned that "the
action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge
transcends constitutional limitations on their powers and invades the
sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control."2'
Barnette generally is believed to stand for a broad interpretation of
the Bill of Rights." However, the case puts forth a "clear and present
danger" test23 which allows a state to suppress freedom of expression
upon a mere possibility of danger to the state; lower courts conceivably
can interpret such a vague holding to permit censorship by school
boards when they feel there is possible danger to the indoctrination of
students to the institutional viewpoints of the community.24 The most
dangerous result of the ambiguity of Barnette is that the lower courts
have been given no guidance as to the permissible framework within
which teachers may work. The courts, ostensibly, only have to work
within the boundaries of a reasonable and legitimate state interest. The
issue becomes what constitutes a legitimate state interest sufficient to
curtail freedom of speech of public school teachers.
Ambach v. Norwick5 presents possibly the most narrow viewpoint of
freedom of expression of teachers. The case examined the constitu-
tionality of the New York Education Law section 3001(3) which did not
allow the certification of any individual who was not a United States
citizen or did not intend to apply for citizenship. Without such certifica-
tion, a teacher could not work in any public school system in the State of
New York. The statute was challenged by two alien-residents who
20 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
" Id at 642.
2 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 589 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
L. TRIBE].
1 319 U.S. at 633.
24 L. TRIBE, supra note 22, at 671. To do justice to the majority opinion,
Justice Jackson does attempt to stress the importance of diversity of opinion in
the American system. He states: "Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only
the unanimity of the graveyard." 319 U.S. at 641.
1 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
[Vol. 30:673
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/7
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
sought a ruling from the Supreme Court that the classification imposed
by the State of New York was suspect and discriminatory. The Supreme
Court rejected the alien-residents' allegations. The Court reasoned that
the state had a legitimate interest "in the preparation of individuals for
participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which
our society rests. .". "" The teacher was portrayed as an individual with
a sacred trust who had a divine mission to uphold in students' minds the
democratic ideals as viewed by the government. The Court determined
that any deviation from these ideals could adversely affect the health of
our democracy.27 Such vague and often admitted limitations on first
amendment freedoms are unacceptable to those who would seek to pro-
mote a broad interpretation for the constitutional rights of public school
teachers. In addition, Ambach legitimizes value inculcation as a state in-
terest, whereas Barnette, forty years earlier, had repudiated such a
view.
A test which seems to be a broad interpretation of first amendment
rights is the test derived from Tinker v. Des Moines School District8
and James v. Board of Education.' Tinker dealt with students' free
speech rights whereas James concerned a teacher's free speech rights.
The two cases had remarkably similar fact situations in that both in-
volved the limits of protected expression on school premises. In both
cases the complainants wore black armbands to signify their condemna-
tion of the United States involvement in the Vietnam War. 0 Both cases
placed the burden upon school authorities to produce evidence which
justified their infringement of free speech rights to protect against
substantial disruption on school premises. In upholding the rights of the
students to protest the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands, the
Tinker Court stated that
[ijn order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able
to show that its action was caused by something more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly when
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbid-
den conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with
26 Id. at 76.
Id. at 79.
28 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 947
(1972).
30 There was no disruption to classroom activities as a result of the wearing of
the armbands nor were there any parental complaints. There was no infringe-
ment on the rights of other students or teachers, and both the students involved
in Tinker and the teacher in James conducted themselves in an unobtrusive
fashion.
1981]
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the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school", the prohibition cannot be sustained. 31
The test under Tinker requires school districts to show not only a slight
possibility of disruption, but they must additionally show that there was
substantial certainty that such disruption would occur.2
Sweezy v. New Hampshire33 adds another element to be utilized in
the above test. The additional element is that the school authorities
must show that the infringement of a constitutional right has a connec-
tion with the interest of the State. 4 Such a test, with its diverse origins,
is applicable to speech by school teachers with regard to outside ac-
tivities, as well as areas within the classroom. However, this test is ap-
plicable to a teacher as long as he is teaching the subject which he has
contracted to teach. Any great deviation from the subject matter which
he is hired to teach could result in dismissal-not for constitutional
reasons, but for a breach of contract. In other words, a teacher who is
hired to teach physics but spends entire class periods discussing Marx-
ism will not be protected, since he is not fulfilling his agreed upon con-
tractual duty.
The only factor which remains to be determined is what constitutes a
fundamental state interest sufficient to give a school board legitimate
justification to infringe upon a school teacher's first amendment rights. 5
31 393 U.S. at 509.
8 Undifferentiated fear of apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any departure from abso-
lute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from the majority's
opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or
on the campus, that deviates from the view of another person may start
an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must
take this risk....
Id. at 508.
3 354 U.S. 234 (1957). The case posed the question of the limits of legislative
inquiry. Sweezy was summoned by the New Hampshire Attorney General as part
of the New Hampshire legislature's inquiry on "subversive organizations." Dur-
ing the course of inquiry, Sweezy refused to answer several questions regarding
the past activities of the Progressive Party. He was adjudged in contempt, and
the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. The interrogation by the Attorney
General was found unrelated to the legitimate state interest which was to
discover if there were any illegal and subversive activities being conducted in the
state at that time. The Supreme Court held that Sweezy's rights under the Due
Process Clause and the first amendment had been violated because there was no
connection between his infringed rights and the purported state interest. Id.
The Supreme Court held in Sweezy that providing information to a state
legislature on a broad topic is not sufficient to justify infringement of a first
amendment right on the basis of a fundamental interest of the State. There must
be specificity in order to uphold this correlation. Id. at 251.
1 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976) (plurality opinion). In this case
Justice Brennan affirmatively asserted that political patronage employment
dismissals cannot be excused on the basis that government operates more effec-
[Vol. 30:673
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The answer is that encroachment of a constitutional right "cannot be
justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest."3 The in-
terest must be of such vital importance so as to be paramount over the
individual's constitutional rights, and the government has the burden of
proof to show the interest is paramount. The conclusive answer to this
issue can also be found in Tinker, where the legitimate state interest
was the efficient and productive operation of the classroom.
Therefore, the prongs of the test courts should use when determining
whether teachers' speech actions are constitutional are: (1) freedom of
speech can only be infringed when there is substantial certainty that
there will be a substantial disruption on school premises adversely
affecting students;" and (2) there exists a specific nexus between such
infringement of speech and a state interest that is of vital importance. 9
When such factors are found, only then can the governing entity be
allowed to curtail public school teachers' freedom of speech.
III. FREE SPEECH WITHIN THE CLASSROOM
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The topic of classroom discussion as related to teacher free speech
rights has not been discussed directly by the United States Supreme
Court as of this time. The federal appellate and district courts, however,
have handled cases dealing with this subject with varying results.4" The
educational system in this country has been described as having two
major purposes: (1) the instruction of students in existing knowledge
and values; and (2) the development of intellect in order to increase that
knowledge.4' Some authorities suggest that the secondary and elemen-
tary levels of education serve the first function while higher education
serves the second. This philosphy has been the justification for exten-
sive control by the states over curriculum in the elementary and secon-
dary classrooms.42 Previously, courts approved the states' attempts to
tively and efficiently under such a system. Id. Using his line of reasoning, a case
could be made for public school teachers by asserting that criticism of their
superiors is not sufficient justification for curtailment of their rights. Moreover,
in Elrod, Justice Brennan gives very little credit to the idea that political
patronage does result in efficient government; there is also no logical connection
that when teachers refrain from criticizing administrative policies and decisions,
there will be an efficient school system. Id.
Id. at 362.
3371&
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
40 T. VAN GEEL, AUTHORITY TO CONTROL THE SCHOOL PROGRAM 121-22 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as T. VAN GEEL].
" Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen,
ACADEMIC FREEDOM-THE SCHOLARS PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 95, 117-19 (1964).
42 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 597 (1970).
1981]
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protect secondary students from undesirable ideas presented inside the
classroom; however, the federal courts have reversed this trend within
the past decade and have encouraged a variety of viewpoints to be
presented in the classroom, whether through philosophy of the course
material or through pedagogical method."3
The marketplace of ideas philosophy demands that education within a
democracy be more than a value inculcation-public education should
also include classroom discussion and school activities which enrich
students' education on various subjects. Such enrichment is enhanced
by the presentation of diverse viewpoints which might seem controver-
sial to the surrounding community." Cases which dealt with first amend-
ment rights of students at public schools have upheld students' rights
and the democratic virtues of diversity and tolerance of viewpoints and
interests." While administrative personnel of school districts serve a
valuable function in determining the general subject matters to be
developed within the classroom in order to produce adults well versed
in the basic academic areas, teachers and students also have the ability
(but not always the opportunity) to expand upon the general
guidelines."' Moreover, the infringement of teacher classroom expres-
sion also serves to curtail student exposure to controversial subjects
within the classroom. 7
While the Supreme Court has not decided any cases which directly
relate to a public school teacher's right to freedom of expression within
the classroom, the Court was presented with an opportunity to rule on
"3 See also Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal.
1969). The case involved high school students who were suspended for publishing
a newspaper, circulated to their schoolmates, which contained profane language.
Several teachers complained of a material disruption of classes and lack of atten-
tion of students as a result of the publication. Id.
" Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and
Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1061 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Nahmod].
45 Id
" Id at 1060-62. Professor Nahmod favors the Tinker methodology which
stresses that education in a democracy should be more than the classroom exer-
cises prescribed by the State and school district-it should also serve to develop
student curiosity in areas not necessarily part of the curriculum, even if such
areas lead to controversial topics. He explains: "[I]mplicit in this 'first amend-
ment theory of education' is the view of high school students as not merely
passive receptacles of knowledge, but as participants in a 'marketplace of
ideas.' "Id. Nevertheless, he asserts that there are certain valid state and parental
interests which may outweigh freedom of expression in the high school class-
room. Such interests include classroom discipline, protection of students from
obscenity, teacher competence, efficient use of classroom time, and the preven-
tion of the use of the classroom as a forum of personal political and social views
by teachers and/or students. Id.
47 1&.
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the basis of a first amendment right of public school teachers in both
Meyer v. Nebraska8 and Epperson v. Arkansas.49
In Meyer, along with its companion case of Bartels v. State of Iowa,"°
the Court examined the problem of instruction of students in foreign
languages when it was in contravention of statutes forbidding such in-
struction by teachers in Iowa and Nebraska. Meyer was decided on the
substantive due process issue of the fourteenth amendment rather than
the first amendment free speech right, as the case recognized a constitu-
tional right to engage in the practice of a chosen profession.5 While the
decision held that there is a legitimate police power of the state in
regard to education, it did not justify abuse of the plaintiffs right to
engage in his chosen occupation. Dicta in the decision, however,
discusses when and where value inculcation is desirable.2 Such dicta has
been persuasive in lower federal court decisions up to the present
time.63
The more recent case decided by the Supreme Court was Epperson v.
Arkansas.' The basis for the decision in Epperson was a violation of the
fourteenth amendment, which encompassed the first amendment's es-
tablishment of religion clause, by an anti-evolution statute. Mrs. Epper-
son, a high school biology teacher, brought the action seeking to have
the anti-evolution statute of Arkansas declared unconstitutional.
Although one of the pertinent issues of the case was that of case or con-
troversy, the Court decided the case within the boundaries of their role
as a "watchdog" over the constitutional freedoms of the American
" 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The case involved a teacher in a Lutheran school who
taught German to a ten-year-old child in contravention of a statute which stated
in part: "No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denomina-
tional, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language
other than the English language." Id. at 397. To place this statute in context, it
must be remembered that any foreign influence was considered undesirable as a
result of the isolationism of the country following World War I.
" 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
50 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
51 262 U.S. at 403.
5" The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with Am-
erican ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic
matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late
war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent adversaries
were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means
adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the state
and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is
plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and
domestic tranquility has been shown.
Id. at 402.
' See, e.g., Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1153 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
393 U.S. 97 (1968).
19811
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classroom.55 The Court expressly declined to decide the case based upon
freedom of speech rights," while recognizing its duty to insure, if
necessary, the individual constitutional fundamental rights in the face of
abuse of local school authorities. 7 The Epperson decision has been
criticized by some commentators as an unsatisfactory interpretation of
the law respecting public school teachers' "rights in the classroom."5
B. Lower Federal Court Interpretations
Notwithstanding the decisions of the Supreme Court noted above, the
lower federal courts have attempted to grapple with the complex issue
of teachers' free speech rights within the classroom. Within the past
decade case law has begun to reflect a test regarding limitations within
the classroom similar to what has been advocated for protected speech
of teachers outside of the classroom. As will be seen, recent lower court
decisions have specifically applied the Tinker test to determine the
limitations of such speech. Apparently, the classroom speech of
teachers, at least on the level of the lower federal court judiciary, has
come under the umbrella of first amendment free speech protection.
Pedagogical methods have come under the ambit of in-class speech
protected by the first amendment. Perhaps the case which established
this contention most visibly was Mailloux v. Kiley,59 wherein the plain-
15 There were questions regarding the current status of Mrs. Epperson as a
teacher in Arkansas and the unlikely possibility of Arkansas enforcing the
statute which apparently had been inactive on the books for 40 years. Id. at
109-10.
SId. at 104-05.
" Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the
Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. Our courts,
however, have not failed to apply the First Amendment's mandate in
our educational system where essential to safeguard the fundamental
values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. By and large,
public education in our Nation is committed to the control of the state
and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolu-
tion of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and
which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values.
On the other hand, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools,"
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
Id.
, Goldstein, supra note 16, at 1310-12. Professor Goldstein asserts that
Justice Fortas' discussion of the case and its relationship to Meyer v. Nebraska
was misplaced, as Meyer involved the infringement of a teacher's constitutional
rights at a private school whereas Mrs. Epperson was teaching at a public school.
Id. However, contrary to the view expressed by Professor Goldstein, Justice Fortas'
opinion could be applied to teachers both in public and private schools. The inter-
pretation of Professor Goldstein is misplaced as the law which was debated in
Meyer was a state law applicable to students in both public and private schools.
" 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 30:673
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tiff, while engaging his class in a discussion of taboo words, placed a
slang word for sexual intercourse on the blackboard as an example of
such a word. The pedagogical method of the teacher was defended by
expert educators who testified at trial. The court in Mailloux was
presented with the issue of whether a teacher has a right to use a cer-
tain teaching method when it is not necessary to fully instruct his class
on a topic and is not on the face of it proper, but is related to the subject
being taught and, in the opinion of some experts, is a proper method.
The right was upheld but not at an absolute level; ° however, the impor-
tance of fostering open minds was recognized by the court:
Our national belief is that the heterodox as well as the or-
thodox are a source of individual and of social growth. We do not
confine academic freedom to conventional teachers or to those
who can get a majority vote from their colleagues. Our faith is
that the teacher's freedom to choose among options for which
there is any substantial support will increase his intellectual
vitality and his moral strength. The teacher whose responsibility
has been nourished by independence, enterprise, and free choice
becomes for his student a better model of the democratic citizen.
His examples of applying and adapting the values of the old
order to the demands and opportunities of a constantly changing
world are among the most important lessons he gives to youth."
The case was finally determined on the basis of procedural due process,
as the court noted that the state does have the right to discharge a
teacher for questionable teaching methods, but it must first warn the
teacher that the methods are considered unacceptable.
The differences between the college and secondary school en-
vironments were also raised in the decision-secondary schools were
described as not rigid disciplinary institutions, but neither were they
seen as open forums of discussion subject to standards generally appli-
cable to adults. 3 Although the court decided in favor of the teacher in
' The Court called such a right more of a "constitutional recognized interest"
which is subject to any rational justification by state regulatory control which only
has to be "reasonable" as defined in such cases as Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S.
97 (1968). Id. at 1391.
61 Id.
6 For the due process considerations as applied to students, see, e.g., Dillon
v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 468 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D. Ark. 1978). Due
process in that case included an opportunity to be heard and a right to confront
the school official who was the accuser. Id.
" The court seemingly subscribed to the contention of some legal scholars,
notably Goldstein in Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student
Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970). Professor Goldstein described pre-
college education as prescriptive and college education as analytic. In his article
Goldstein asserts such roles are actually desirable in order to establish value in-
culcation within the public schools. Id.
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Mailloux, the decision was not based upon the reasoning of Tinker
which described freedom of expression as protected activity unless a
substantial disruption of the classroom is a result of that expression. A
notice requirement was mandated by the court in cases where a school
teacher used a teaching method which is not supported by a pre-
ponderant majority of education experts, but which the teacher proved
has a connection to the subject matter which conceivably could assist
students in the learning process. Any sanction placed on the teacher
would have to be subsequent to a notice warning the teacher of the
unacceptability of the implemented method: "This exclusively proce-
dural protection is afforded to a teacher not because he is a state
employee, or because he is a citizen, but because in his teaching capacity
he is engaged in the exercise of what may plausibly be considered 'vital
First Amendment rights.' "" Thus, the decision does not uphold an ab-
solute first amendment right subject only to the substantial disruption
test of Tinker, but it does provide a more acceptable solution to poten-
tial abuse of teacher rights than some of the other decisions which pro-
ceeded through the federal judiciary during the early 1970's. 5
Teacher free speech rights within the classroom can be legitimately
distinguished from free speech rights outside of the classroom made
solely as a citizen espousing personal opinions.6 First amendment pro-
tection has not been given to speech normally when (1) the teacher ig-
nored or subverted the basic course of study as prescribed by the school
board, or (2) he introduced supplemental course material which substan-
tially disrupted the classroom, contained obscene material, used offensive
words or materials, engaged in unacceptable indoctrination or used
teaching methods which were not approved by the majority of the edu-
cational community. 7 Therefore, courts have tended to rule against
teacher-plaintiffs when there is a substantial disagreement as to the
contents of a course or with a personal counselling of students when
such counselling is not a part of the specific duties of that teacher. 8
323 F. Supp. at 1392.
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973). The opinion in this case
totally rejected the protection of teaching methods by the first amendment. Ms.
Hetrick stated to her class, "I am an unwed mother" (when she was actually a
divorced mother) to illustrate the irony of language in her college English class.
Other allegedly unacceptable conduct included occasional discussions of the Viet-
nam War in her classes. Ms. Hetrick's contract was not renewed based on the
fact that others in her department did not find her methods "adaptable to the
achievement of the academic goals of the University." Id. The right of the
teacher as an individual in this case was overshadowed by the asserted rights of
the institution; there was not even a discussion by the court as to whether the in-
stitution's expectations were reasonable or arbitrary.
See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 972 (1973).
67 T. VAN GEEL, supra note 40, at 122.
" See Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972
(1973). The case involved a teacher who taught a health survey course which,
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Furthermore, a teacher was held to not have the right to express con-
troversial views to her students when her superior admonished her not
to do so, and when the subject of the views was related to student and
teacher discipline. 69 Courts take into account the age and sophistication
of the students, relevance to the educational purpose and manner of pre-
sentation when making a determination as to whether material is offen-
sive.70
The cases dealing with free speech rights of teachers in the early
1970's enlarged upon the "substantial disruption" standard of Tinker
and had almost submerged that doctrine. The courts failed to recognize
that what could potentially be considered offensive and disruptive to a
community of adults is nothing more than what will assist children in
coping with the more sophisticated and complex world of today.
Moreover, it is ironic that while case law is rapidly expanding the rights
of children to free speech, thus signalling a "first amendment theory of
education" with emphasis on students' needs and interests, teachers
have been stymied in their attempts to aid students in coping with
modern-day issues."
The Tinker "substantial disruption" test was applied in the case of
Parducci v. Rutland."2 In Parducci, a high school teacher was dismissed
after assigning her English classes to read Welcome to the Monkey
according to school administrators, overemphasized sex. He was also in the habit
of counselling students with the door closed. When the teacher was requested to
cease such activities, he refused, and was subsequently dismissed. 474 F.2d at
928.
69 Ahern v. Bd. of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391, 1397 (D. Neb. 1971). A teacher's
severe criticism of another teacher because the the latter had allegedly slapped
one of her students created unjustified insubordination, when the teacher was
directed to desist from any further criticism and from using economics classtime
to consider a declaration of student rights. The teacher failed to do so, and the
court upheld the dismissal by asserting that what would be a first amendment
right to free speech under ordinary circumstances may not be protected if the
speech involved is a direct violation of an order by a superior related to a
legitimate state interest. The asserted state interest which justified the curtail-
ment of free expression was faculty harmony. Id
70 See, e.g., Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 984 (7th Cir. 1974).
Distribution of material related to the film Woodstock was deemed to be inap-
propriate for eighth grade students as it advocated the use of marijuana and free
love. Even the aspect of procedural due process was denied to these plaintiffs as
indicated by the Court's statement:
Whether they knew of the statute or not [an Illinois statute requiring
edification of young students of the harmful effects of alcohol and nar-
cotics], we consider that these teachers should have known better than
to hand their young students something that invited the use of the
described drugs. Additionally, appellants had been aware of and had par-
ticipated in previously presented teaching programs expounding upon
the baleful consequences of the use of drugs and alcohol.
Id.
71 Nahmod, supra note 44, at 1061.
7 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
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House by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., and her principal ordered her not to teach
the story as it advocated "killing off elderly people and free sex."7 She
was dismissed, according to her superiors, because the story had a
disrupting influence on the school. Three of her students had requested
being excused after their parents had complained about the assignment.
The court found that the story did have literary merit, and there was no
substantial disruption of the classroom. The case stands for the proposi-
tion that parental complaints and other outside influences are not rele-
vant in determining whether there is a substantial disruption of the
classroom. Thus, the case meets both of the facets of the Tinker-Sweezy
test: (1) there was no substantial disruption of the classroom; and (2) the
teacher's utilization of her right to free expression within the classroom
did not cause the almost imperceptible disruption that did occur. It was
solely the reaction of parents and administrators to that protected ex-
pression which caused the disturbance. The teacher's assignment of the
story did not correlate directly with the disruption that did occur suffi-
cient to meet the direct nexus requirement of Sweezy.
In Dean v. Timpson Independent School District,74 Mrs. Dean, a
teacher with an outstanding reputation, gave her students a survey on
perceived views of masculinity which appeared in Psychology Today.
She was dismissed on the basis that the survey was obscene. There had
been no disruption of the classroom, and apparently the only complaint
lodged at the school was by a grandmother of one of the students. The
court held that a teacher has a constitutional right to engage in a
teaching of his or her own choosing even when the topic might be con-
sidered controversial- the court affirmatively asserted the Tinker doc-
trine, by stating: "In order to justify a restraint on First Amendment
freedom in the schools, the disruption must reach a material or substan-
tial degree." The court failed to accept the idea that an issue which is
introduced into the classroom which is upsetting to members of the
community is sufficiently materially disruptive to curtail free expres-
sion by the teacher on that controversial issue. Dean displays a par-
ticularly flagrant and callous disregard on the part of the school district
to due process, because Mrs. Dean was never informed that her
teaching method was considered unacceptable even though she was
questioned quite extensively by the principal as to the validity of the
survey as a teaching aid.7
11 Id. at 354.
'4 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979).
" Id. at 307.
" Id at 306. Such complete disregard of due process was narrated by the
Court as follows:
On Friday, March 26, 1976, Mrs. Dean was relieved from duty. She was
told by Superintendent Higginbotham that she was "being relieved of
duty, effective immediately." Mr. Higginbotham did not allow her to
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Further imput by teachers which is seen as protected first amend-
ment speech includes curriculum changes. In Loewen v. Turnipseed,77
teachers, students, textbook authors and superintendents challenged a
decision by the state textbook committee in Mississippi for choosing one
textbook on Mississippi history over another. The conditions and social
implications of slavery were more graphically and extensively described
in the book which the educators preferred to utilize in their courses on
Mississippi history. The teachers' argument was that the textbook com-
mittee, by choosing a textbook more complimentary to Mississippi
history, inhibited their ability to teach the complete and truthful history
of the state. The court ruled that there must be some check over a
government's total control over ideas presented in the classroom, and
one method of doing so is by permitting a teacher to teach in an environ-
ment where she does not feel the threat of dismissal for conducting
discussions of controversial issues. There is a constitutional right for all
of those involved in the educational process to have appellate pro-
cedures available so that governmental views are not perpetuated
without check."8 In Loewen the court displayed a fear that the State of
Mississippi would perpetuate the concepts of segregation and dis-
crimination by its unjustified refusal to accept what the educators con-
sidered a more viable textbook of Mississippi history.79
C. Summary
Protection for in-classroom freedom of speech for teachers should be
subject to the broad interpretation of first amendment rights as advanced
under Tinker and Sweezy. Tinker's expansive protection of student free
speech extended to any speech action which was not materially dis-
ruptive of the classroom. Free speech does extend further than the
state-ordained classroom subject material. Moreover, such limitations
on free speech make a mockery of that very principle:
Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in
fact. Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right
could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government
has provided as a safe haven for crackpots. The Constitution
says that Congress (and the States) may not abridge the right to
free speech. This provision means what it says. We properly
read it to permit reasonable regulation of speech-connected
activities in carefully restricted circumstances. But we do not
complete the school day. She was allowed to return to her classroom only
to get her purse, leaving all other personal belongings behind.
Id.
77 488 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
" Id at 1154.
79 Id
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confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a
telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to super-
vised and ordained discussion in a school classroom.80
According to Tinker, therefore, free speech should not be restricted to
any extent unless disruption of the classroom occurs or the rights of
others are infringed. Teachers who espouse unpopular opinions should
not be severely restricted.
The implementation of the second facet of the broad constitutional
first amendment test for public school teachers can be seen as quite
necessary within the sphere of speech within the classroom. The cases
which deal with this controversy arise out of the protestations of in-
dividuals other than students.81 Therefore, the test brought forth in
Sweezy is that the nexus should be between the substantial disruption
of the classroom, which is the legitimate state interest, and the speech
of the teacher. Only then can teachers' liberties within the area of ex-
pression be tread upon by the government.2 As a result, only com-
munication by a teacher which completely demoralizes the concept of
the classroom as an arena of knowledge will override the broad protec-
tions under Tinker and Sweezy.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH FOR TEACHERS
OUTSIDE OF THE CLASSROOM
Similarities exist between freedom of expression inside and outside
the classroom for teachers-the freedom of speech of teachers outside
of the classroom is also subject to a balancing test of the constitutional
rights of teachers as compared to the state's interests.13 The controver-
sial issue is which state interests override the constitutional rights of
teachers.8' Tinker would dictate that so long as a teacher fulfills his con-
80 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. at 513.
81 See, e.g., Dean v. Timpson Independent School Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.
Tex. 1979), and Brubaker v. Bd. of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974).
82 No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes. Scholar-
ship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our
civilization will stagnate and die.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 250.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
E. BOLMEIER, supra note 1, at 74-87. Bolmeier discusses those activities
which periodically result in a teacher being dismissed because public interest is
disturbed. A teacher has a right to engage in political campaigning which does
extend to campaigning within the schoolroom. Id. A teacher may be denied
holding a state legislative seat because of possible contravention of the principle
of separation of powers embodied in a state constitution regarding the legislative
department and executive department. However, teachers have the constitu-
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tractual duty, he should be entitled to say what he pleases or engage in
activities which further his personal interests as long as no material
disruption of the classroom occurs.
The Pickering85 decision is probably the most influential decision in
destroying the historically-evolved position that a public school teacher
had very little legal protection in regard to first amendment rights.
The prior state of the law was reflected in Justice Holmes' comment
that a public servant "may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."87 Pickering signals
the beginning of an era wherein the public school teacher is not compelled
to relinquish his first amendment privileges which he would otherwise
enjoy as a citizen." However, this is not always the case, as demon-
strated by the following discussion of administrative criticism, "subver-
sive" activities, discrimination based on political views, loyalty oaths
and union activity.
A. Administrative Criticism
Under the combined Tinker and Sweezy test, administrative criticism
is to be allowed and even encouraged in a majority of cases. A teacher's
criticism should only have sanctions applied against it when the
criticism is so malicious and untrue that his superiors are in a position
of complete derogation and are unable to function in the community. 8
Only then could such criticism be harmful to the state interest of an effi-
cient and trusted educational institution. In that case, the students are
adversely affected because they are unable to trust those who are
responsible for their education, and the direct cause of such distrust is
the malicious misstatements of their teachers. Under such cir-
cumstances, a classroom would be disrupted. The test applied is that of
New York Times v. Sullivan0 which allows a public official to recover
tional right to express themselves on matters which are of concern to the public;
a teacher, however, does not have the right to character assassination.
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Stevens, Balancing Speech and Efficiency: The Educator's Freedom of Ex-
pression After Pickering, 8 J.L. & EDUc. 223 (1979).
87 McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
While Pickering discusses expression by a public school teacher, its reason-
ing has been applied to free speech rights of various government employees. See,
e.g., Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955
(1973) (chaplain at a state mental hospital); Flynn v. Giarruso, 321 F. Supp. 1295
(E.D. La. 1971) (police officer); Murphy v. Facendia, 307 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo.
1969) (VISTA members).
9 Teachers can be prohibited from expressing political views during school
hours and/or in the classroom. Outside activity may also be the basis for deter-
mining a teacher's fitness for teaching. See, e.g., Rackley v. School Dist., 258 F.
Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966), and Goldsmith v. Bd. of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157, 225 P.
783 (3d Dist. Cal. 1924).
9 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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for libel only if the person making the statement does so with "actual
malice." 91
Sanctions against criticism of superiors is an unconstitutional-prohi-
bition in most occupations if legitimate communications methods are
utilized. 2 A superintendent of schools in a Virginia school district was
forbidden to participate actively in political activities in connection with
the United States presidential elections in 1884.11 A legislative enact-
ment prohibited "the active participation in politics of certain officers of
the state government."9 ' The superintendent's violation of this act
resulted in his suspension from office. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia declared the legislation null and void on the basis it violated
the Constitutions of both Virginia and the United States. In declaring
this position the court clearly stated that the enumerated constitutional
rights were for all citizens, not merely certain classes of citizens.
The issue repeatedly advanced for a court's adjudication is whether
the public school teacher's first amendment privileges are always
superior to the purported state interest involved. 7 Generally, the
state's interest has been held as paramount when an educator's outside
political activities carry over into political campaigning within the
classroom. 9
"' As defined in the New York Times v. Sullivan decision, actual malice is
publication "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." Id. at 280.
92 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Justice Marshall cau-
tions governmental entities against discrimination among different users of the
same method of communication. Id. This holding is applicable to public school
teachers, in that a school district's message is clearly broadcast throughout its
schools in a variety of methods, ie., by administrative personnel, policy rules,
publications distributed throughout the school and community and by selection of
personnel.
" Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, 52 A.R. 626 (1884).
94 Id.
" The Court utilized the first amendment of the United States Constitution in
its reasoning and art. I, §20 of the Constitution of Virginia wherein it is said: "All
citizens of the state are hereby declared to possess equal civil and political rights
and public privileges." 79 Va. at 200 (Emphasis added).
Id at 206.
" For a conservative analysis on teachers' speech activity which can result in
dismissal based on a standard of "adjudged good moral conduct by respectable
people in the community," see Weaver, Grounds for Removal or Suspension of
Public School Teachers, 8 S.D. L. REv. 138 (1963) (examples being derogatory
remarks made at parent-teacher meetings and refusal to answer questions posed
by a State Senate Committee).
" Goldsmith v. Bd. of Educ., 66 Cal. App. 157,225 P. 783 (3d Dist. Cal. 1924). A
California school teacher urged his students to ask their parents to consider a
candidate for the board of education. The teacher was suspended and the Third
District Court of California upheld the suspension based on the concept that
"such conduct can have no other effect than to stir up strife among the students
over a contest for a political office, and the result of this would inevitably be to
disrupt the required discipline of a public school." Id.
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Outside expressions of a public policy are only to be curtailed when
such curtailment is not arbitrary or malicious and must be within
reasonable limits.9 A teacher who actively promotes the desegregation
of public schools has been held to have a constitutionally protected right
based on Edwards v. South Carolina,' wherein it was stated that a
state cannot make a criminal offense out of a "peaceful expression of un-
popular view."'"' The potential abuse of disregarding this directive by
the Supreme Court is a community which is deprived of the ideas of its
teachers. Notwithstanding the fact that teachers are very often taxpay-
ing citizens of the district in which they teach, teachers are very often
in a position to contribute intelligent commentary on the political issues
of a school district. Because of the vantage point teachers occupy, they
can see the strengths and weaknesses in the organization and policies of
a school district. There is much to be said for those who advocate that a
school district which remains unchallenged can become complacent and
fail to constantly strive to upgrade the quality of education. Possible
criticism by teachers can only force school officials to either silence the
protesting voices of the teachers via unconstitutional means, or in-
stitute and maintain an educational system that is immune from such
criticism. '02
Such a position was maintained by the Supreme Court in the case of
Pickering v. Board of Education.'°3 Pickering had written a letter
critical of bond proposals submitted to the taxpayers which criticized
the allocation of funds by the school board, and his letter contained
numerous inaccuracies.' 4 The Board contended that a "teacher by virtue
of his public employment has a duty of loyalty to support his superiors
in attaining the generally accepted goals of education and that, if he
must speak out publicly, he should do so factually and accurately, com-
mensurate with his education. .. ""' Although the Court refrained from
making a general statement regarding all critical statements of school
" Rackley v. School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 676, 684 (D.S.C. 1966).
11 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
101 Id. at 237.
102 Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The Limits of Official
Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REV. 578, 580 (1980). In this article, which generally deals
with government agencies, Professor Ziegler writes that the United States is in
danger of becoming a totalitarian government due to the active political cam-
paigning by agencies to promote their self-interests. Id. "It is a truism that, if a
governing structure based upon widespread genuine citizen opinions is to survive
as a viable democracy, it must place legal restraints on the government's ability
to manipulate the formation and expression of that opinion." Id. This idea can
also be applied to school boards. Teachers as citizens must be able to express
what they see as wrong with the system so that school boards have access to
teachers' opinions as well as those of other citizens. Such a method avoids self-
perpetuation of the same staid policies.
103 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
SId. at 570.
105 Id. at 568-69.
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boards by public school teachers, it refused to condone school boards for
dismissal of teachers if their remarks were essentially critical in tone."
In other words, mere differences of opinion on a general public interest
will not suffice. Moreover, since the fact of employment was only in-
substantially a part of the situation which caused Pickering's dismissal,
the Court held that the teacher is to be treated as part of the general
public. Indeed, Pickering was acting as a citizen when he wrote his letter.
The decision generally tried to harmonize an educator's freedom of ex-
pression with the interest of a school district in efficiency.
Pickering left unanswered the question of what result should ensue if
the teacher and school board disagree as to the reason for the teacher
sanction. What do the courts do when they have a teacher who claims
his dismissal was a result of protected (albeit unpopular) speech and a
school board who maintains the dismissal was for conduct unrelated to
the speech? Such cases bring up a problem of burden of proof, i.e., which
party to the action must prove that the reasons set forth were or were
not "substantial and sufficient" for the dismissal."°7 Eight years after the
Pickering decision the Court addressed itself to a case in which a
teacher called a radio station and revealed to the public a memorandum
circulated by his principal to teachers on their appearance. 8 The lower
courts held that the teacher's dismissal was substantially related to the
constitutionally protected telephone call; the Supreme Court, however,
remanded the case for further proceedings. 9
The decision was the result of a more conservative Court than that
which existed eight years before in Pickering. Justice Rehnquist
discussed the Court's doubt that there was a constitutional violation
whenever a teacher's protected speech plays a "substantial part" in a
termination decision. The Court said:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected
conduct played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision
not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as a
result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than
he would have occupied had he done nothing. The difficulty with
the rule enunciated by the District Court is that it would require
reinstatement in cases where a dramatic and perhaps abrasive
incident is inevitably on the minds of those responsible for the
decision to rehire, and does indeed play a part in that deci-
sion-even if the same decision would have been reached had
the incident not occurred. The constitutional principle at stake
is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is placed in no
108 1d
'0 Stapp v. Avoyelles Parish School Dist., 545 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1977) (em-
phasis added).
108 Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
log Id.
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worse a position than if he had not engaged in the conduct. A
borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employ-
ment question resolved against him because of constitutionally
protected conduct. But that same candidate ought not to be able,
by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assess-
ing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire
on the basis of that record, simply because the protected con-
duct makes the employer more certain of the correctness of its
decision."'
While certainly the rationale of Mt. Healthy does present a logical argu-
ment for school officials, the opposite reasoning can be advocated for
teachers. In a case when a teacher has made what the administration
may deem an undesirable speech, a school board may look for justifica-
tion for dismissal of a teacher based on conduct unrelated to the speech.
However, the speech is the catalyst for the administration in trying to
extricate the teacher from the system. Insubordination is a vague but
permissible ground for dismissal in most states."' A board of education
could conceivably dismiss a teacher based upon an insubordinate act,
which under normal circumstances would be overlooked, or a past action
previously forgiven could be brought up again. Therefore, the decision
in Mt. Healthy is only justifiable when it is clear that the teacher's
dismissal is not related to the protected and unpopular expression, and
the conduct which serves as the basis for the dismissal is unrelated to
the speech." 2
110 Id. at 285-86.
" Insubordination can mean many things according to the interpretations of
the different state courts. Massachusetts defined insubordination as "a willful
disregard of express or implied directions of the employer and a refusal to obey
reasonable orders." McIntosh v. Abbott, 231 Mass. 180, 120 N.E. 383 (1918). The
Arizona Supreme Court said that lack of cooperation is a characteristic of insub-
ordination. School Dist. v. Superior Ct. of Pinal County, 102 Ariz. 478, 433 P.2d 28
(1967). An Ohio court stated that in order for conduct to be considered insub-
ordinate it must be a willful and persistent violation of regulations, and it must
be of the same nature and gravity to justify termination of an educator's con-
tract. Rumora v. Bd. of Educ. of Ashtabula, 43 Ohio Misc. 48, 335 N.E.2d 378 (C.P.
Ashtabula County 1973).
"' Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 385, 394 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Wolly]. Wolly advocates the institution of a remedy whereby
teachers do not suffer under the Mt. Healthy decision which is only oriented
toward the employer. Id. Under the "but for" test, there are instances using the
Mt. Healthy rationale when a teacher would be dismissed because of conduct
unrelated to protected speech made by the teacher. However, in those cases in
which the protected speech had been a factor in the dismissal, even though the
school board proved to the court's satisfaction that the speech was not the
substantial cause of the dismissal sufficient to order reinstatement or back pay,
the teacher should be able to offer evidence of any actual injury resulting from
the forbidden speech factor of the school board's decision from which the teacher
might collect some compensation. Wolly states that those employees who are
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A public school teacher does not forfeit first amendment protection
against governmental abridgement of freedom of speech by expressing
views privately with a superior rather than publicly. In Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District,"' the Court dealt with a
teacher who criticized the school district's handling of desegregation in
a private conversation with her principal. Although the Court did not
agree with the argument by the school board that the speech was not
protected first amendment speech because it was made to an unwilling
"captive audience," Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court,
did state that the speech had to be subject to reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions in order to be protected."' Justice Rehnquist stressed
the relief offered in the Mt. Healthy opinion to employers who were at
times forced to reinstate public employees because constitutionally pro-
tected conduct was a substantial part in the employer's decision to
discharge."' The employer need only show by a "preponderance of the
evidence" that it would have dismissed the teacher even without the
protected speech.11
The Supreme Court has held strictly to the reasoning of Pickering;
they attempt to balance the teacher's freedom of expression with the
school's efficient operation. Generally, speech in a public forum is more
likely to be constitutionally protected than expression inside the
classroom. The decision in Mt. Healthy curtails the helpfulness of
Pickering to teachers, however, because the burden of proof is no longer
on the school board to show a legitimate reason related to the educa-
tional efficiency of the schools. 7 Pickering in itself is not a broad
enough interpretation of teacher's first amendment rights because it
does not state that all speech critical of administration is permissible, in
and out of the classroom, unless it adversely affects the students.
fired for justifiable job-related reasons will suffer less emotional stress than
those who have been dismissed partially because of constitutionally protected
speech or conduct. Id. Therefore, the employee should be compensated for the
mentally disturbing effects of the admittedly impermissible considerations.
"' 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
114 Id. at 415-16.
"' Id at 416.
116 429 U.S. at 287.
117 Wolly, supra note 112, at 390. Mt. Healthy has shifted the burden of the
Pickering balance test. The plaintiff-teacher now has the burden of proving
whether the protected constitutional speech was the cause of the discharge. If
such proof is offered by a plaintiff, the defendant can preclude a remedy by show-
ing that it would have reached the same decision without the existence of the
constitutionally protected speech. This final question must be handled by the
plaintiffs whereas under Pickering the burden only would have been to prove
whether the protected speech was a substantial part of their discharge, and the
court would have provided some sort of remedy. See Brown v. Bullard Indepen-
dent Sch. Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1981) (No. 80-2000).
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B. Subversive Activities and Discrimination on the
Basis of Political Views
Unquestionably, under the Tinker and Sweezy test the political per-
suasion of teachers should be immaterial to the operation of public
schools. There are no problems under that test even when the teacher
holds radical conservative or liberal beliefs. As long as such ideological
leanings are not propagandized to the students, there can be no adverse
effect on them."1 8 The problems arise when a teacher, in connection with
such ideologies which are unacceptable to the mainstream of the com-
munity, becomes involved in activities which are brought to the public's
attention. The question then becomes does such knowledge adversely af-
fect the students. When a teacher advocates his far-left or far-right
tendencies to his students, the problem becomes even more acute.
There is no question that teachers have a right to voice their opinions
without official hostility.' 9 An equal protection problem is in issue when
there is any infringement upon a teacher's right to speak out on his
beliefs without being discriminated against. In addition, schools may not
try to keep schools "pure" with one ideology paramount by hiring only
teachers subservient to such viewpoints.' 0
Board of Education v. Barnette'2 ' involved children of Jehovah's
Witnesses who refused to salute the American flag because of their
religious beliefs, in violation of a West Virginia statute. The Court
stressed that suppression of an opinion is tolerated by the Constitution
only when the expression causes a clear and present danger.'22 Any fun-
damental rights-such as the rights of freedom of speech and
religion-should be outside of the political sphere.'23 Application of the
Barnette test to teacher political speech would lead to the conclusion
that teachers' political speech activities are protected expression
because they are among the enumerated fundamental rights of the Con-
stitution. However, if speech or activity presents danger to the status
quo of the educational system, there is a sufficient clear and present
danger for the State to take steps to silence that menace according to
Barnette. The decision is not sufficiently extensive because the State's
interest is always presumed to be the correct interest. 124
..8 Van Alstyne, Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 841, 851 (1970). Professor Van Alstyne asks the always-relevant balancing
query: Does not the public interest served by a public employee's freedom to
speak out in controversial situations outweigh the tendency to "frankness" in the
operation of our educational institutions to preserve the status quo? Id.
9 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
121 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 633.
123 Id. at 638.
124 Justice Frankfurter's dissent provides readers with the opportunity to ob-
serve indoctrination. He concludes his dissent with a warning concerning pre-
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Controversy exists in American society today, and our educational
system should prepare students for the challenge. It is unrealistic to ex-
pect that when controversial subjects are presented to teachers, either
in current events or through curriculum, they should be expected to
maintain a neutral position. Teachers should represent existing diversity
in American society.'25 As Justice Jackson stated in Board of Education
v. Barnette, "official disciplined uniformity" and "compulsory unification
of opinion" could only lead to "disappointing and disastrous end: the
unanimity of the graveyard."'2 6 The Court reaffirmed its position
against totalitarianism in the schools in the Tinker decison.'27 However,
there is a conflict between a need to maintain a proper academic en-
vironment and a need to promote an atmosphere conducive to personal
political activities. When such an atmosphere is unavailable, the rebel
teacher finds himself in trouble.
There is a constitutional guarantee to engage in political activities of
one's own choosing.'29 The government cannot intrude into the sphere of
a person's mind. 3 ' An infringement of the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of political association places the burden upon the offending
governmental entity to prove a legitimate state interest. A Supreme
Court decision, Healy v. James,3' squarely corroborates the proposition
servation of the American democratic society: "Only a persistent positive trans-
lation of the faith of a free society into the convictions and habits and actions of a
community is the ultimate reliance against unabated temptations to fetter the
human spirit." Id. at 671 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125 A. MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 271-72 (1974). It
is admitted that there is a necessary element of some indoctrination in American
education today. Professor Morris states there are two types of indoctrination.
The first is the teaching of "fundamentals of a branch of knowledge." The second
type is where there exists differences of opinion between people equally compe-
tent to form opinions on an area, ie., social sciences, religion and politics. In the
first sense the teacher is in a superior position to the students although classes
should still be conducted in an open atmosphere. In the second sense all view-
points should be discussed or the topic is not adequately covered. The one-sided
discussion results in what Professor Morris calls "obnoxious indoctrination." Id.
" 319 U.S. at 641.
"7 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
12' Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
922 (1970). The teacher in this case was hired by the Air Force to teach English
to visiting foreign officers. He was removed from his position because of remarks
made against the Vietnam War because they greatly departed from the assigned
subject matter and inefficiently used class time. Id.
'" The Sedition Act of 1778 was unconstitutional because it conferred a penalty
upon those who criticized the government and public officials which was contrary
to the first amendment. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
"3 "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern-
ment the power to control men's minds." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969).
13' 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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that a governing body must bear the burden of proof. In this case a campus
organization allegedly connected with the radical Students for
Democratic Society (SDS) sought campus recognition which was refused.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, stating that the
burden must be borne by the university to show an overwhelming state
interest sufficient to override first amendment protections. A court of
appeals decision in the same year which related to a teacher who wore
a black armband to express his disapproval of the Vietnam War due to
his association with a religious group (Quakers) outside of school followed
similar reasoning.132 Any limitation on political activity, according to
that decision, must flow from reasonable and logical inference of fact. It
will not be sufficient for the government officials to have an anticipation
of disruption of classroom or of harm to students.13  Under such a con-
cept, a teacher who is shown on the television news protesting the con-
struction of a nuclear plant in his neighborhood would ostensibly be safe
from curtailment of such activity unless there is proof that he in-
timidated a student into working for the cause. Unless there is such a
distant cut-off point in political advocacy, the teacher is in danger of not
being allowed to express his values in life. It is essential that the poten-
tial disruption is not just a preconceived idea used only to override the
freedom of expression."3
The law as it now exists in this area does agree with the Tinker and
Sweezy test."' Mere passive membership in an organization will not suf-
fice to allow a school district to dismiss a teacher." 6 There must be a
specific intent to further an unlawful aim in order to justify dismissal.37
Thus, a professed Communist can be employed as a public school
132 James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 Id. at 572.
nu Thus, it is not enough for Mr. James' principal to state that "wearing the
armband would tend to be disruptive and would possibly encourage pupils to
engage in disruptive demonstrations." Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
... But see Alder v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). The case upheld New
York's Feinberg Law which was later ruled unconstitutional in Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). There is a memorable quote from Alder regard-
ing employees of the public schools of the State of New York by Justice Minton:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble,
speak, think and believe as they will .... It is equally clear that they
have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own
terms. They may work for the school systems upon the reasonable terms
laid down by the proper authorities of New York .... If they do not
choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs
and associations and go elsewhere.
342 U.S. at 492. Such a position makes totalitarianism of the majority community
paramount and completely abridges the teachers' rights under the Bill of Rights.
136 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
... Id. at 246.
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teacher as long as his Communist views do not manifest themselves in
speech or actions advocating a violent overthrow of the government.
There must be some element of guilty knowledge or actual conduct to
effect such a violent alteration in the form of government.' 8 Any other
interpretation of the first amendment would result in a teacher being
subject to loss of job or other sanctions solely because of activity
remotely associated with a subversive group. And the definition of what
is subversive must not be so broad that it includes within the organiza-
tions which are lawful. '39
Probably the most important case involving teachers engaged in
subversive activities is Keyishian v. Board of Regents.'4 ° That decision
debated the issue of removal of public employees based upon
"treasonable or seditious" utterances or acts, and the Court ruled that a
teacher cannot know what difference there is between seditious and
nonseditious utterances and acts.' It was not sufficient, according to
the Court, to merely advocate a doctrine. However, the other important
holding of the case is that mere membership in a subversive organiza-
tion, even with knowledge of the organization's illegal goals, cannot
justify punishment nor may it establish a presumption of moral un-
fitness.'42 Mere membership in a subversive organization does not pose a
threat as a teacher or as a citizen based solely on that membership.' If
there is a disruption because of such a membership, it would tend to
come from another party (i.e., a parent or an administrator). Therefore,
merely belonging to a subversive organization does not satisfy the
Sweezy element of the test which is a direct correlation between the
activity of the teacher and the disruption of the classroom, which is the
asserted state interest in the analysis.
The more recent decisions of the Supreme Court seem in conflict with
a proposition established in one of its earlier decisions, Beilan v. Board
of Education.' In that case, a nexus was established between a
teacher's failure to give information regarding loyalty and political
'38 Id.
'" See generally with reference to what is unconstitutionally overbroad,
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). The Court dismissed an argument
regarding "fighting words" because the statute involved was not drawn narrowly
enough to punish only "fighting words." Therefore, because the statute could en-
compass constitutionally protected speech the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad. Id
110 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
"' Id. at 599.
1,2 Id. at 607.
Id at 605-06. Keyishian expressly overrules Adler v. Bd. of Educ. at this
point. Id. See note 135 supra.
"1 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
[Vol. 30:673
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol30/iss4/7
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
activities and ability to teach.'45 According to Beilan, a public school
teacher undertakes obligations not necessarily assumed by those in
private enterprise-obligations of frankness, candor and cooperation.'46
The holding of this case thwarts the first amendment because it equates
fitness as a teacher with noncontroversial political beliefs. There is no
disruption of classroom if a teacher fails to furnish to administrative
superiors information as to activities and beliefs.
Fortunately, the Beilan rationale was repudiated two years later in
Shelton v. Tucker.'47 Although in Shelton it was left to the states to
reserve a right to judge the fitness and competence of its teachers, the
determination of such fitness was not to be through a demoralization of
first amendment freedoms.'48 The case mentions the chilling effect that
first amendment inhibition has upon teachers; teachers become timid in
expressing their political view in their respective ways because of the
fear of unwarranted intrusion on their professional activities. Unlimited
scope of statutes and regulations pertaining to organizational activities
is an overextension of permissible state inquiry into fitness and com-
petency of teachers. The Shelton decision was equally applicable to the
facts of Beilan. When the state inquires into organizational member-
ships, there exists an abuse of power by the State which breaches the
teachers' first amendment rights. If first amendment rights are not
allowed to exist freely in the school environment by the individuals
operating the schools, a hypocritical situation exists whereby the vir-
tues of the American system are taught while those same virtues are
concurrently withdrawn by that system.' 9
Subversive activities will generally not result in curtailing a teacher's
speech under the Tinker-Sweezy broad first amendment test. Only
when the subversive activities impose upon the academic environment
of the classroom can the teacher be forced to surrender his rights. Out-
of-classroom activities which in no respect intrude on the classroom can-
' But see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Fact of association alone
cannot determine disloyalty and unfitness for a job; such an inhibition, according
to the Court, suppresses the flow of democratic expression).
"" 357 U.S. at 405.
"4' 364 U.S. at 479 (1960).
" Id at 487.
DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). This case dealt with the absurdity
of prosecuting an individual who attended a peaceful political meeting of the
Communist Party. The prosecution was in violation of the individual's due pro-
cess rights in addition to the first amendment which guarantees freedom of
political participation. Id. It is not reasonable to expect teachers to detail to
government their political activities when those citizens who are in the private
sector are not forced to detail their political activities. All United States citizens
are entitled to the benefit of their first amendment rights without undue state
interference.
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not be a legitimate justification by a government to curtail first amend-
ment rights. The legitimate state interest advocated in Tinker is a
material disruption of the classroom. Subversive activities can only
cause a material disruption if the teacher advocates blatant viewpoints
which indoctrinate students without stating the reasoning of the majority
of the community. In addition, administration criticism of a teacher
could cause classroom disruption. However, administrative criticism
resulting in disruption of a classroom would not meet the Sweezy test
because there would be no direct correlation between the teacher and
the disruption. That direct correlation would exist between the ad-
ministration and the disruption.
C. Loyalty Oaths
Teachers are often subjected to loyalty oaths which require an affir-
mation of support of the United States along with promises to respect
the flag and policies of the United States government-the state interest
used to justify such oaths is that the state needs protection from
employees who might be disloyal or subversive. Employers maintain
that they can constitutionally command allegiance of employees to the
,state and federal constitutions.' However, such a contention is
violative of first amendment rights within the educational system.'
There may be numerous reasons why an individual would prefer not to
participate in a loyalty oath."2 Contrary to the decisions in some courts,
there is not a necessary connection between expressing loyalty to this
country and fitness as a teacher.5 ' An individual might have fine at-
tributes which make him a superb teacher such as knowledge of course
material, patience and ability to foster students' understanding.
However, refusal to swear to a loyalty oath because of political or
religious beliefs might render the qualifications of that teacher irrele-
vant. There would never be a case whereby failure to give a loyalty oath
would result, in and of itself, to justify such a dismissal. The failure to
swear to a loyalty oath would not meet the test of Tinker requiring a
material disruption of the classroom.
11 Knight v. Bd. of Regents, 390 U.S. 36 (1968); Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S.
399 (1958); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
15' Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
152 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (religion);
see Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (political activities).
15 But see CAL. EDUC. CODE. § 44334 (West 1980), whereby certification will
not be granted to teachers in California unless they have subscribed to the re-
quired oath: "I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of
the United States of America, the Constitution of the State of California, and the
laws of the United States and the State of California." Id. The statute calls for a
suspension and revocation of a teacher's credentials upon violation of the terms
of the oath or affirmation. Id.
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Teacher's loyalty oaths are generally struck down by the courts on
grounds of vagueness. Whitehill v. Elkins'4 was a 1967 decision of the
Supreme Court which struck down the Maryland teachers' loyalty oath
as unconstitutional and void for vagueness.' 5 Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, expressed concern regarding the construction of the
Maryland Subversive Activities Act, as he feared the Act would encom-
pass persons who were not subversive in the sense of advocating the
overthrow of the United States government through force or violence.' 6
The oath must not be so "vague and broad as to make men of common
intelligence speculate at their peril on its meaning."'5 7 Douglas' decision,
while considering first amendment elements of chilling the free speech
of teachers, did not recognize the existence of loyalty oaths in
themselves an infringement of first amendment rights.' The state in-
terest justified by those oaths is a denial of the Bill of Rights.' 9
Teachers should only have to be concerned with the state interest of
educating students. Perhaps the proper oath a teacher could be con-
stitutionally compelled to take would be promising to teach the subject
matter for which he was hired. Any interjection of controversial opin-
ions on politics, religion or other areas of diverse opinion would be ex-
plained to the children as his own opinion. In addition, a teacher would
have to agree not to abuse his position to recruit students to his own
philosophical beliefs. Whitehill recognizes a state right to establish pro-
cedures to ascertain if a person is a subversive. One who comes within the
definition of being a subversive person will not necessarily be a morally
unfit person for teaching.'6 ° "Juries might convict though the teacher
389 U.S. 54 (1967).
, Id. at 62. Not only did this particular statute require statement of loyalty to
the federal and state governments, but it also subjected the teacher to perjury
charges if the teacher swore to the loyalty oath as an untrue statement of his
feelings. Id.
'5 MD. ANN. CODE art. 85A, §§1, 11, 13, 15 (repealed 1978).
15, 389 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 60.
Asper, The Long and Unhappy History of Loyalty Testing in Maryland, 13
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1969). In an article deeply critical of loyalty testing, Pro-
fessor Asper makes a relevant point as to the harmfulness of loyalty oaths:
It is a political weapon susceptible to cynical uses and, so used, may
create suspicion, ill-feeling and ugliness among citizens and neighbors.
Finally, the doleful fact is that loyalty testing, more often than not,
punishes persons who place a high value on personal integrity and in-
dividual rights while failing entirely to apprehend those who would in-
jure the society it purports to protect.
Id. at 98.
'" Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). On the contrary, Adler stated
that because of the "sensitive area" of the classroom the state had a duty to
screen the unfit persons of our society in order to maintain the "integrity of the
schools as a part of ordered society." Id.
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did not subscribe to the wrongful aims of the organization......
Justice Douglas dissented four years later in Cole v. Richardson,6 '
where an employee in a state hospital refused to take a loyalty oath.
Again in Cole the purpose of loyalty oaths was seen "to assure that
those in positions of public trust were willing to commit themselves to
live by the constitutional processes of our system." '163 The particular
oath in Cole had a clause advocating opposition to the overthrow of the
United States government by force, which made the oath acceptable to
the Supreme Court.'
The situation which existed in Cole presents a possible no-win situa-
tion for a teacher who cannot subscribe to a loyalty oath for his own in-
dividual reasons. The case establishes an irrebuttable presumption that
because there is no constitutionally protected right to overthrow the
government of the United States by force,"5 there is no constitutional
infringement by making a loyalty oath mandatory. A school teacher may
assuredly believe that the United States government will be violently
overthrown at some time in the future; the teacher may even believe
that such actions will result in a preferable form of government for the
country. Such a belief does not necessarily imply that the person is not
capable of being an excellent teacher, both academically and morally.'66
Although this case does not deal with loyalty oaths of state employees,
other Supreme Court cases concerning teachers have been based on the
same reasoning.'67 The Supreme Court continually fails to recognize that
161 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966).
162 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
's Id at 684.
164 Compare Whitehill v. Elkins, which involved a loyalty oath whereby the
teacher was required to swear that he did not in any way participate in an at-
tempt to overthrow the government. This was considered impermissibly over-
broad because there exists the possibility an individual could further such aims
without ever being aware that he was involved in such a goal. Contrary to that,
the Cole loyalty oath stated that the person giving the oath would oppose any
such violent overthrow of the government. The cases differ on the question of
vagueness because in Whitehill an individual could be unaware of the violent
tendencies of organizations to which he belonged whereas in Cole, an individual
will always know whether he is personally opposed to the overthrow of the
government. Id.
165 405 U.S. at 686.
166 Id at 691-98. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, while defending that part of
the loyalty oath which required the employee to "uphold and defend" the state
and federal Constitutions, warned of the over-prevalence of loyalty oaths in this
country. "It is the duty of judges, however, to endeavor to remain sensitive to
those issues and not to 'encourage the casual taking of oaths by upholding the
discharge or exclusion from public employment of those with a conscientious and
scrupulous regard for such undertakings.' (Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373-74
(1964))." Id. at 697-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"6' In fact, it is debatable that loyalty oaths as they apply to public school
teachers are less logical in application than loyalty oaths for state and particularly
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the existence of a loyalty oath is a violation of first amendment
privileges. Content is really immaterial as long as loyalty to the state is
equated to teacher morality and loyalty to the school.
The pledge of allegiance, recited in thousands of schoolrooms daily, is
a form of loyalty oath. A Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, Russo v.
Central School District,168 presented an interesting convolution of the
law whereby the children in a school district were given broader first
amendment rights than their teachers. "9 A New York board of educa-
tion allowed children to not participate in the pledge of allegiance on the
basis of Board of Education v. Barnette,"' but it required the teachers
to lead their classes in the pledge. This case exemplifies the danger that
mandatory loyalty oaths can actually present to a school district as well
as the teacher. The teacher refused to recite the pledge of allegiance
although she respectfully stood with her hands at her side while the
class was led by another teacher. She had a good record with the school
system and never involved her students in her own quiet protest. The
protest was only evidenced by her refusal to recite the pledge of
allegiance because of a sincere conviction that the conditions envisioned
in the pledge were not the conditions enjoyed by all Americans. A
danger was presented to the school board because there was danger to
the system of losing a proven classroom teacher.17 Such an action would
also have inhibited faith in first amendment freedoms in that district.
A parallel case to Russo which involved an honor student arose short-
ly thereafter.7 ' As in Russo the court recognized that nonparticipation
in the pledge of allegiance, done so as not to disrupt the rest of the stu-
dent body, cannot be prohibited because of a protected first amendment
right not to participate-the judge pointed out toward the end of his
decision that a violation of first amendment rights would only serve to
federal employees. Government workers are often placed in highly sensitive posi-
tions (ie., defense) whereby it is necessary for public benefit to trust an in-
dividual who believes that what he is doing is correct philosophically. It would
not do to have a self-proclaimed Nazi supervising nuclear weapons if this country
is at war with a fascist government. However, public school teachers are not in a
position where they can irreparably harm the children. Any substantial harm
to children because of a teacher's lack of loyalty would quickly be monitored and
correlated whereas that would not necessarily be the case of federal employees
in sensitive positions.
1I Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
932 (1973).
169 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969), and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
10 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
171 469 F.2d at 626. There was evidence presented that not only was Mrs.
Russo a competent teacher but that she was an exemplary teacher who had a
good pupil-teacher relationship. Id
172 Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1973).
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create distrust in the American government."'3 Only through the
asserted protections of the Bill of Rights can one come to recognize the
benefits of this country so that one can then participate in pledges of
allegiance and loyalty oaths.
Loyalty oaths serve as a method for school employees to be screened.
Although oaths which require teachers to disclaim membership in the
Communist Party are generally struck down as unconstitutional, oaths
which declare loyalty to the government remain constitutional. Because
public school teachers remain vulnerable to such loyalty oaths, they re-
main open to dismissals based on lack of loyalty. A lack of belief in the
American governmental system does not necessarily result in moral tur-
pitude rendering an individual automatically unfit to teach children."'
The sole state interest which should be binding upon public school
teachers is education of students.
A loyalty oath, in and of itself, would not cause a material disruption
of a classroom as required under Tinker. The loyalty oath is merely the
school district's method of screening individuals who do not believe in
the virtues of American democracy. Since a fervent belief in American
values is not necessary to actually teach the facts which inspire the
values, it is immaterial whether an individual subscribes to the beliefs
in order to teach them.
D. Unions
It is indisputable that teachers are allowed to organize themselves for
collective bargaining purposes. McLaughlin v. Tilendis175 upheld the
right of teachers to form labor organizations, as well as recognizing that
membership in such organizations also implies a freedom to advance the
beliefs and ideas inherent within that organizational framework.176 Lack
of tenure has been held not to affect advancement of organizational in-
terests.177 Union advocacy invites controversy among natural adver-
saries-teacher and administration. However, the question of the limits
of freedom in regard to advancement of the aims of teachers' unions is
nevertheless to be held to the proposed two-facet test for freedom of
speech.178
173 Id. at 638-39.
174 469 F.2d at 633, 634.
175 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
17 The freedom to participate in association and speech for advancement of
beliefs and ideas is considered an inseparable part of the "liberty" assured to
United States citizens by the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment,
as stated by the Supreme Court in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958).
177 McLaughlin v. Tillendis, 398 F.2d at 289.
178 A developing area of teacher union-related speech concerns the rights of in-
dividual teachers who either as nonmembers of the union or as dissenting
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In general, union members are entitled to free speech protection for
comments made pursuant to gathering together for mutual aid and ad-
vice. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia'79 the issue was
whether the Brotherhood could carry out a plan for advising injured
workers as to possible legal assistance. Such a plan would have advised
the injured workers of specific attorneys whom they could contact to
render legal aid. The Court in this case recognized that statutes on the
books regarding recovery of damages by injured workers in the railroad
industry were not sufficient to insure the full benefit of compensatory
damages. When the union involved itself in the situation, it helped in-
sure the workers that they would receive their full benefits. The Court
stated that there was no doubt that the railroad workers had first
amendment rights to "gather together for the helpful purpose of helping
and advising one another in asserting the rights Congress gave them
members feel their particular viewpoints on issues are not taken into account by
the unions. Two important cases within the past five years have dealt with this
developing area of law.
In City of Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), a nonunion teacher spoke during a public discussion
at a board of education meeting on the subject of pending labor negotiations be-
tween the board and the teachers' union. The teacher asked for a postponement of
one issue and presented a petition by teachers which also called for an impartial
examination into the "fair share" clause requiring all teachers, whether members
or not, to pay union dues. The union, in turn, filed a complaint with the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission charging that the board, by allowing a non-
union teacher to speak at the board meeting, engaged in collective bargaining with
an individual of the bargaining unit other than the exclusive-bargaining represen-
tative. The Supreme Court held that the speech by the nonunion teacher did not
constitute "negotiation" with the board; in addition, the Court stated that it
would be a violation of the first amendment for a state to require a board of
education to prohibit nonunion teachers from speaking at meetings where public
participation is permitted, even if the subject is pending negotations between the
board and the teacher union. Id The language in this case seems consistent with
the rights of teachers as citizens which was the standard in the Pickering case.
In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), a Michigan statute
authorized "agency shop" union representation for public employees. This ar-
rangement provided that every employee was represented by the union even if
not a union member. A condition of employment was that a service charge be
paid in lieu of union dues for nonunion members. The appellants were teachers
who brought an action alleging that the union was engaging in political activities
of which appellants did not approve, and they asked that the agency shop be
declared invalid as contrary to their first and fourteenth amendment rights. The
Supreme Court held that the "agency shop" arrangement was not a violation of
the first and fourteenth amendments insofar as the service charges were used in
advancement of collective bargaining activities. Id. However, it was unconstitu-
tional for the service charges to be used for political purposes unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining, and the employees could prevent union expenditures irrelevant
to collective bargaining. Id This decision seems to allow a teacher to function as
an individual citizen within the purview of Pickering.
17' 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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. ,,*"18o Moreover, the Court found that the right to render aid to a
fellow union member was a constitutionally guaranteed right.18'
A recent case dealing with assistance rendered by one union member
to another, Columbus Education Association v. Columbus City School
District,'2 brought this issue to the forefront with regard to teachers'
unions. In that case a junior high school teacher, who was also the
building representative for the Columbus Education Association, had a
letter of reprimand placed in his personnel file because of his "zealous
advocacy" of another teacher's complaint. The teacher reasoned that the
placement of the letter in his file violated his freedom of speech, and it
curtailed his ability to act as a zealous advocate as required by his union
representative role. A prima facie case was established that the repri-
mand infringed constitutionally protected activity and speech. The
school district claimed that its actions had not abridged the teacher's
first amendment rights, and it based a defense on the case of Bishop v.
Woods.' Bishop took a less-than-favorable attitude toward the constitu-
tional rights of public employees as indicated by the dicta of the Court:
The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to
review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily
by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that num-
erous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day admin-
istration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot
feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review for
every such error. In the absence of any claim that the public
employer was motivated by a desire to curtail or penalize the
exercise of an employee's constitutionally protected rights, we
must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous,
can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect
or ill-advised personnel decisions.18'
The district court apparently felt bound by this dicta, and it found that
the school district was not motivated by a desire to curtail the speech of
the teacher. Without that actual intent to deprive the teacher of free
speech, the district court refused to grant any remedy to the teacher.
However, the court of appeals held that the Bishop case was dissimilar
in many respects from the case before it. The defense in Bishop was
that there was no property interest. The teacher in Columbus Educa-
tion Association was not alleging a property interest; rather he was
"' I& at 5.
181 Id. at 6.
182 623 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1980).
13 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
' Id at 349-50 (emphasis added).
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stating a cause of action based on harm to reputation which had a chill-
ing effect on his freedom of speech and association.
The court of appeals based its decision on the three landmark cases of
Pickering, Mt. Healthy and Givhan. The court held that the Mt. Healthy
balancing test was met because the teacher sustained his initial burden
of proof by showing that his advocacy as a building representative served
as the substantial reason for the letter of reprimand. 85 Such union ad-
vocacy is constitutionally protected expression according to
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. The school district then failed to
prove that the efficient administration of education outweighed the
teacher's free speech rights. 8 ' In addition, the time, place and manner of
the private statements failed to legitimize to the court any rationality
for the letter of reprimand.'87 The court could not see that the teacher's
speech activity threatened the school district's institutional efficiency.
It is conceivable under Givhan that the manner of the teacher's speech
could have been considered insubordinate, and therefore harmful to har-
mony among the administration and the faculty. That potential limita-
tion on union speech could be eliminated by implementation of the two-
facet test.
The court of appeals did choose to apply the first facet of the proposed
first amendment test presented; school operations were not disrupted
under the Tinker test. The court ruled that the teacher's speech did not
involve any misconduct such as direct public criticism of his
supervisor. 88 The court of appeals final opinion was that a teacher must
be allowed to act as a zealous advocate so long as the school district can
show no impairment of a state interest.
Although an individual has a first amendment right to form and join a
labor union, unions have been subject to some first amendment
discrimination. The Supreme Court has given legitimacy to the idea that
the Communist Party utilizes union leadership as a method of encourag-
ing strikes, and Communist influence in union leadership could result in
manipulation of "innocent" union members unwittingly to form
Communist-style policy within the organization.88 Such a rationale gives
623 F.2d at 1159.
16 Id. at 1160. The factors in this case which could justify state regulation of an
employee's speech include content of the speech, co-worker harmony, maintaining
discipline by immediate supervisors, the need for personal loyalty and confidence
between workers and supervisors. Id
187 Id at 1160.
A good case to consider in regard to co-worker animosity is Hochstadt v.
Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976).
Dr. Hochstadt, while in pursuit of achieving a higher salary and equal working
conditions for female employees of the Foundation, managed to alienate herself
from most of the people at the Foundation by "errors in her preparation of grant
requests, and her abuses of secretarial xeroxing and telephone facilities." Fur-
ther evidence considered by the Court was her disruption of the office in pur-
suance of potential grievances. Id.
'" American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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Congress a legitimate right to deny positions of leadership to those per-
sons identified with subversive beliefs and organizations. Federal courts
have been loathe to uphold first amendment rights where statutory in-
fringements of free speech and association are involved because of the
doctrine of abstention, as it was recently applied in the 1979 Supreme
Court case of Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union.19
The most current Supreme Court ruling as of this writing on the
status of union representation is Smith v. Arkansas State Highway
Employees, where grievance proceedings were initiated by employees
of the Arkansas State Highway Department."'1 The Department would
not consider any grievance unless the employees submitted their
written complaints directly to the employer. This procedure denied the
union the opportunity to represent its employees. The Supreme Court
held that such inability to represent the employees was not a violation
of the first amendment. Under this reasoning a public employee can
speak freely and petition openly, and the first amendment protects him
from retaliation from engaging in the speech; however, the first amend-
ment does not impose an obligation on the public employer to listen or
'90 442 U.S. 289 (1979). In this case the Supreme Court indicated that state
courts should adjudicate first amendment controversies involving unions and
state statutes. The national farm workers union sought a declaration that por-
tions of an Arizona farm labor statute were unconstitutional, and it also sought
an injunction against enforcement of the statute. The portions of the statute
against which the union asked for an injunction were a section specifying pro-
cedures for the election of employee bargaining representatives, a provision
limiting union publicity directed at consumers' agricultural products, and the
statute's criminal penalty provision. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
abstention should apply to resolve statutory procedures which potentially violate
a first amendment interest. Id. The abstention doctrine as stated by the Supreme
court is that federal courts should not rule upon an issue until the state court has
an opportunity to construct the questioned provision. The court applied the
abstention doctrine to all three of the questionable provisions of the statute. The
question of which state interests could curtail the advocacy of union members
was not even considered. The decision definitely does contain disadvantages for
teacher participation in union activities. Id.
Apparently the decision places teachers, and any union member, in a position
that where state statutory curtailment of speech is involved, the first amend-
ment interests should not preclude the utilization of the abstention doctrine. The
doctrine of abstention creates a problem of time and expense, and it is therefore
inappropriate when freedom of speech is involved. An action which a federal
court postpones on the basis of abstention assumes the litigants have the
monetary resources to initiate litigation first through the state courts, and, if
necessary, through the federal courts. The worst disadvantage is that there is a
chilling effect placed on the free speech right until resolution by a state court or
a federal court. The decision also leaves open the question of equal protection for
labor unions. The publicity provision of the statute discriminated against
employees in that they were not allowed to communicate with consumers
whereas employers had no such curtailment on their right to reach the public.
191 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
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recognize the association or to bargain with it. This case fails to
recognize that the first amendment is supposed to protect a union's
right to engage in legal representation for its membership. The case
fails to uphold the concept that a union is to act as a zealous advocate
for its membership, and it is a limitation on the power of unions to act in
such a representative capacity.
In summary, collective bargaining and representation of members
with grievances has become a part of the American lifestyle which
enables workers to have decent living and working conditions. Teachers
are not unlike other workers who have long accepted the advantages of
union activity. The Supreme Court, while recognizing the free speech
rights of labor unions, has failed to develop a standard which sets out
the state interests which would justify curtailing union free speech, if
there are any. Until it does so, the lower courts will come to differing
conclusions based on similar fact situations such as Columbus Education
Association and Smith. The situation places teachers and other union
members in a quandary as to what limits they may carry their zealous
advocacy. Such a standard by the Supreme Court should reflect respect
for the teacher's individual first amendment rights by reinforcing the
idea that nothing should curtail an individual's free speech rights except
possible harm resulting to pupils as a result of the speech. In addition, it
should require that the specific speech of the teacher-union member
cause the disturbance before the state interest in protecting students is
invoked, so that effective advocacy by a teacher representative is not
hindered by intervening factors which cannot be controlled by the
teacher. Only then can the Sweezy element of the broad first amend-
ment test be met.
V. CONCLUSION
There exists justification for the expression by teachers of their own
viewpoints both inside and outside the classroom.'92 Within the
classroom public school teachers, by expressing their particular view-
points on a wide range of subject matters, develop in children the
perception that disagreement does exist with regard to topics which
normally have only the institutionalized perception available to them.'
The teacher serves as a source of knowledge where the teacher feels
" Yudof, When Government Speaks: Toward a Theory of Government Ex-
pression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 863, 876-82 (1979).
,"I But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 73-80 (1979), wherein Justice
Powell seemed to take the opposite position when he advocated the role of public
school teachers to prepare their students for citizenship by instilling values
essential for the democratic way of life. Id. His message was clear: The state in-
terest was paramount in regard to instilling these values. The rights of a teacher
were subordinate to the state interest when a teacher, who because of dif-
ferences in heritage, might propose to her students viewpoints not always consis-
tent with the perception of the state regarding democratic values.
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unrestricted in his expression; broad first amendment freedom of ex-
pression might extend into methods of teaching,194 or even active
disagreement with the authorities.' Therefore, children are taught that
individual thinking is accepted in this society, and hopefully they will be
encouraged to do independent thinking on their own. 9 ' It also follows
that when students learn of their teachers' outside activities, they will
learn that American society does not punish individuals for independent
expression.197
The Tinker decision has received much support subsequent to 1969
from scholarly commentators on the law and from courts in their deci-
sions relating to both in-classroom and out-of-classroom speech by public
school teachers. The standard set forth in that decision seems the most
likely one to encourage the "marketplace of ideas" environment within
the classroom, while insuring that no disruption from such speech
adversely affects the students. As recent court rulings have interpreted
the decision, the disruption of the community is not the same as disrup-
tion of the classroom. Thus, the Sweezy facet of the test applied in this
Note, ie., direct correlation between state interest and the speech, has
been faced by the courts. First amendment rights of teachers can only
be infringed by authorities when a legitimate state interest is involved.
Within the educational sphere the only legitimate state interest is the
welfare and education of the students.
Such a test is to be strictly construed as it applies to teacher free
speech outside of the classroom because teachers are to be treated as
any other citizen when not acting within the sphere of the classroom.
Admittedly, protected speech for teachers within the classroom is sub-
ject to stricter scrutiny by the state because of contractual duties and
supervisory responsibilities. However, unless the speech of the teacher
directly causes disruption of the classroom, the school district should
not interfere with the expression.
JANIS L. REYNOLDS
19 Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (1973).
, Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
19 Shiffrin, supra note 2, at 652.
19 M. NOLTE, GUIDE TO SCHOOL LAW 42 (1969). Then there are those who ad-
vocate, as does Mr. Nolte, that teachers have a duty at all times to conduct
themselves properly so that there is no adverse effect on children of "tender"
years. Id. In other words, teachers, by virtue of their contracts with the school
systems, have a duty to conform to its standards.
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